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Abstract
Concern over illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing has led to a number 
of policy, trade and surveillance measures. While much attention has been given to 
the impact of IUU regulation on industrial fleets, recognition of the distinct impacts 
on small-scale fisheries is conspicuously lacking from the policy and research de-
bate. In this paper, we outline three ways in which the application of IUU discourse 
and regulation undermines small-scale fisheries. First, the mainstream construction 
of “illegal,” “unreported” and “unregulated” fishing, and also the categorical use of 
“IUU” in an all-inclusive sense, disregards the diversity, legitimacy and sustainability 
of small-scale fisheries practices and their governing systems. Second, we explore 
how the recent trade-related measures to counter IUU fishing mask and reinforce 
existing inequalities between different sectors and countries, creating an unfair bur-
den on small-scale fisheries and countries who depend on them. Third, as IUU fish-
ing is increasingly approached as “organized crime,” there is a risk of inappropriately 
targeting small-scale fisheries, at times violently. Reflecting on these three trends, 
we propose three strategies by which a more sensitive and ultimately more equitable 
incorporation of small-scale fisheries can be supported in the global fight against IUU 
fishing.
K E Y W O R D S
catch certification, developing countries, fisheries governance, maritime security, organized 
crime, seafood trade
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1  | INTRODUC TION
Illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing is attributed as 
a major cause of overfishing around the world. Annual IUU land-
ings are estimated at 26 million tons globally, equivalent to one-
in-five wild-caught fish, with a net annual cost of between $10 
and $23 billion (Agnew et al., 2009; Pew Trusts, 2018; Sumaila, 
Alder, & Keith, 2006). Faced with the scale of these figures, re-
gional fisheries management organizations (RFMOs) and intergov-
ernmental organizations—now increasingly joined by a broad range 
of NGOs and individual states—see the elimination of IUU fishing 
as essential to securing sustainable fishery resources into the fu-
ture (e.g. Cabral et al., 2018; Erceg, 2006; FAO, 2001a, 2001b; 
Flothmann et al., 2010; Pitcher, Watson, Forrest, Valtýsson, & 
Guénette, 2002).
Early impetus for addressing IUU fishing came from the 
United Nations (UN), which at the turn of the century (from 
1999 to 2000) declared it as “one of the most severe problems 
affecting world fisheries” (UNGA, 1999). This led to the Food and 
Agriculture Organization's (FAO) International Plan of Action to 
Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated 
Fishing (IPOA-IUU) in 2001 (FAO, 2001a). Over time, the UN 
has expanded its IUU framework through the 2009 Port State 
Measures Agreement (entered into force in 2016) aimed at reg-
ulating landings and transshipment of fish from foreign-flagged 
vessels (Pew Trusts, 2018). RFMOs, most of which fall under the 
remit of the UN’s Law of the Sea, have also gradually addressed 
IUU fishing in transboundary waters through a range of monitor-
ing, control and surveillance (MCS) measures, albeit with varying 
effectiveness (e.g. Cullis-Suzuki & Pauly, 2010; Haas, Haward, 
McGee, & Fleming, 2019). IUU fishing is also taken up under the 
UN Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 14, which further ex-
horts countries to improve coastal state controls, and national 
legal frameworks (see Haas, Fleming, Haward, & McGee, 2019).
Meanwhile, international trade-based measures have evolved 
over time to augment traditional MCS approaches to IUU 
(He, 2017; Stokke, 2009). Both unilateral and multilateral trade-
based measures have been put in place, including cargo docu-
mentation, voluntary vessel registries, country report cards and 
private consumer-directed product labelling schemes (see Helyar 
et al., 2014; Le Gallic & Cox, 2006; Stokke, 2009). Most notably, 
overt trade-restrictive measures have been implemented by major 
seafood markets such as the European Union (EU) and United 
States (US). The EU-IUU regulation restricts or blocks imports 
if exporting countries do not show significant efforts to address 
IUU activity in their waters or by vessels under their control (see 
Miller, Bush, & Mol, 2014; Miller & Sumaila, 2016; Soyer, Leloudas, 
& Miller, 2018). The US Seafood Import Monitoring Program 
(SIMP) in contrast relies on an import permit system, whereby 
catch data and documentation are requested from US-based sea-
food importers, instead of government-to-government certifica-
tion (He, 2018). 1The United States (US) has implemented a similar 
IUU-related measure. In 2014, the US government established a 
“Comprehensive Framework to Combat Illegal, Unreported, and 
Unregulated Fishing and Seafood Fraud” (dated 17 June 2014) with 
the aim of establishing reporting procedures for importation of 
“at-risk” fish (NOAA, 2019). In 2018, this framework transformed 
into the mandatory Seafood Import Monitoring Program (SIMP), 
implemented under the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation 
and Management Act, with the aim of ensuring transparency for 
13 seafood species vulnerable to IUU and/or mislabelling seafood 
(see NOAA, 2019). Under SIMP, there are provisions for individual 
exporting firms to gain “trusted trader” status, if they can estab-
lish and verify their supply chain is free of IUU fish or fish product 
and falsely labelled seafood product (NOAA, 2018). Those with 
this status can benefit from reduced reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements. Unlike the EU-IUU regulation, the US-SIMP does 
not implement country-level exclusion from the US market as a 
result of non-compliance. But small-scale fisheries remain vulner-
able to the increased information requirements demanded under 
US-SIMP—which increases their dependency on their buyers or 
“third parties” to support documentation and traceability (see 
Djelantik, 2016; He, 2018). Amid recent calls to expand these 
forceful trade measures to other major importing countries, such 
as Japan and China (Sumaila, 2019), this article uses the lon-
ger-running and more widely discussed EU policy as an illustra-
tion of the wider shift to trade-restrictive IUU regulation.
While the breadth of IUU fishing countermeasures is impressive, 
we argue that they have a strong tendency to homogenize fishing 
activity either by the country in which they operate, by the export 
species they target or by the sector they encapsulate. Categorical 
assumptions of what IUU is and how it should be “fought” hold sig-
nificant consequences for small-scale fisheries (SSF), a sector that 
includes 86 per cent of motorized fishing vessels (corresponding 
to 12 m in length or less), 90 per cent of the fisheries workforce 
and two-thirds of catches destined for direct human consumption 
globally (FAO, 2018). By their very nature, small-scale fisheries do 
not commonly fall under reporting regimes or government regula-
tory frameworks aimed at industrial and other large-scale fisher-
ies. Yet, because IUU fishing is frequently interpreted and applied 
without distinguishing the particularities of small-scale fisheries (see 
Drammeh, 2001; Isaacs & Witbooi, 2019; Luomba, Chuenpagdee, & 
Song, 2016 for exceptions), the wide range of countermeasures out-
lined above risk undermining not only the well-being of small-scale 
fishers (including achievement of SDGs 1 and 2 aimed at poverty 
elimination and food security) but also the ability of the measures to 
be legitimate and effective in the long run (Berkes & Nayak, 2018; 
Coulthard, Johnson, & McGregor, 2011).
In this paper, we reflect on how the assumptions, terminology 
and regulations associated with IUU fishing have the potential to 
negatively impact small-scale fisheries. Our analysis is divided into 
four parts. First, we argue that the conflation of “illegal,” “unre-
ported” and “unregulated” into “IUU” erases the distinction between 
small-scale and industrial fleets, and also inadequately discriminates 
between the distinct illegal, unregulated and/or unreported activ-
ities. Second, we review the various ways in which counter-IUU 
     |  833SONG et al.
measures, seen through the EU’s trade policy example, lead to un-
fair assumptions of the role and function of small-scale fisheries and 
small-scale fisheries-dependent countries. Third, we reflect on the 
growing tendency to frame IUU fishing as “crime” and the effect this 
has on the growing criminalization of small-scale fishers. Finally, we 
discuss how a more small-scale fisheries-sensitive approach can be 
attained in the global fight against IUU fishing by outlining three 
broad strategies.
2  | THE “L ARGE-SC ALE” CONCEPT OF IUU
The concept of “IUU fishing” emerged out of concerns related to in-
dustrial fishing fleets operating in the high seas—in particular the 
longline toothfish fishery in the Antarctic Ocean within the CCAMLR 
framework (the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic 
Marine Living Resources).2 From this specific context of the high 
seas, “illegal,” “unreported” and “unregulated” fishing is now com-
monly used to explain the main drivers of global fisheries decline 
regardless of the social or ecological context in which these fisheries 
are practiced (Palma, Tsamenyi, & Edeson, 2010). In the process, the 
non-differentiation of illegal, unreported and unregulated under the 
banner of “IUU” “obscures the policy responses required by treating 
as one what are really several distinct problems calling for as many 
distinct solutions” (Serdy, 2011, p. 272). Following this observation, 
we argue there are at least three ways in which the non-differenti-
ated use of “IUU” fishing has negatively affected, and even delegiti-
mized, small-scale fisheries.
First, the categorization of illegal fishing as a concern of 
the state has tended to ignore the existence of plural rule sys-
tems governing small-scale fisheries activity (i.e. legal pluralism, 
Bavinck, 2005; see also Adhuri, 2013; Foale, Cohen, Januchowski-
Hartely, Wenger, & Macintyre, 2011; Rahman et al., 2017). It is 
widely documented that many small-scale fisheries are self-gov-
erned through a range of customary rules, most of which were 
developed in the absence of the state (see Ruddle & Satria, 2010). 
But as the inland and coastal waters and the fisheries resources 
within them have been gradually enclosed within (sub)national 
state regulation, small-scale fisheries practices have also been sub-
sumed under state managerial control (sensu Scott, 1998; see also 
Bavington, 2010; Butcher, 2004; Campling & Havice, 2014). In the 
process, fishing activity and tenure arrangements that fall outside 
state control have been made “illegal”—even when there may be 
existing rules controlling fishing effort or allocation. For example, 
traditional tenure systems governing coastal fisheries resources in 
the Pacific were in some cases weakened and eliminated by the im-
position of formal laws by colonial governments (Johannes, 1978; 
see also Chirwa, 1996; Gustave & Borchers, 2008). Such formal 
proclamations of “illegality” have serious implications for local 
cultures, livelihoods and economies. If enforced, fishing activity 
can be shut down, informal trade significantly curtailed and so-
cio-cultural linkages between coastal communities eroded (Fabinyi 
et al., 2014; Ross, Adhuri, Abdurrahim, & Phelan, 2019). The aim 
here is not to imply that self-governance rules in small-scale fisher-
ies are necessarily more effective in controlling stock status than 
government control. Instead, it highlights the need to recognize 
the empirical reality that diverse forms of management, including 
self-governance, exist and even prevail in small-scale fisheries (e.g. 
see Foale et al., 2011; Zeller & Pauly, 2019).
Moreover, the sharp binary of what is “legal” makes everything 
else illegal by definition, undermining more nuanced understand-
ings of legality/illegality as a spectrum of beliefs, values and prac-
tices (Benda-Beckmann, 2002; Nahuelhual, Saavedra, Mellado, 
Vergara, & Vallejos, 2020). As illustrated in the Philippines, the use 
of beach seining, while illegal in the eyes of the law, is often tol-
erated by fishers, community members and local-level government 
officials as compared to more destructive fishing methods such as 
cyanide or blast fishing (Eder, 2009; see also Bell, Hampshire, & 
Topalidou, 2007). It thus appears prudent to understand the sever-
ity, frequency, magnitude and acceptance of “illegal” activity in de-
termining the applicability of IUU-related measures.
Second, unreported fishing refers to the misreporting or non-re-
porting of relevant information, including the volume and composi-
tion of catch and landings, vessel movement and catch location and 
vessel registration (Palma et al., 2010; Serdy, 2011; Theilen, 2013). 
The failure to collect such information is deemed to undermine 
efforts to assess stocks; create and implement harvest strategies; 
and eliminate fraudulent practices at sea and the market through 
traceability and transparency (Bailey, Bush, Miller, & Kochen, 2016; 
Duggan & Kochen, 2016).
Small-scale fisheries are, however, chronically unreported be-
cause, unlike industrial fisheries, landing sites are widely distributed, 
vessels are small and numerous, and their catches have generally 
not been included into national stock assessment and management 
methodologies (Duggan & Kochen, 2016; Quetglas et al., 2016). In 
addition, the small-scale sector across a number of countries has his-
torically been excluded from reporting requirements either because 
of weak state capacity to enumerate these fisheries (Govan, 2014) 
 2The origin of the “IUU fishing” concept can be traced to the concerns discussed within 
the CCAMLR (the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living 
Resources). During the 15th Session in 1996, specific concerns about illegal and 
unreported fishing were first raised. Illegal fishing, particularly in the longline fishery for 
toothfish in the Antarctic Ocean, was identified as a particular challenge. Likewise, 
fishing activities of vessels flying the flags of non-CCAMLR members were described as 
unregulated fishing, who also provided no reports of their catches from the Convention 
area. Since the first formal mention of IUU fishing during the 16th Session of the 
CCAMLR in 1997, the concept began to appear regularly at CCAMLR meetings. In 1999, 
the term also found its way into meeting reports of the FAO, the International Maritime 
Organization, the UN General Assembly and other regional fisheries management 
organizations (RFMOs) to refer broadly to a combination of unsustainable fishing 
activities by both members and non-members. In FAO, the term IUU fishing was formally 
adopted and became a central part of its international fisheries policy at the 23rd Session 
of the Committee on Fisheries (COFI) in 1999. A series of rapid developments 
concretized the IUU fishing notion, including the Rome Declaration on Responsible 
Fisheries in 1999 to develop an international plan of action to address IUU fishing as well 
as a global review of IUU fishing by FAO (see Bray, 2001). A draft text of “International 
Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter, and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated 
Fishing” by the FAO Expert Consultation on IUU Fishing was tabled in May 2000, 
followed by FAO Technical Consultations on IUU fishing. Finally, the COFI in March 2001 
adopted the text of the IPOA-IUU, which was subsequently endorsed by the FAO 
Council at its 120th Session in June 2001 (see FAO, 2015; Palma et al., 2010 for more 
details).
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and/or because assumptions made in stock assessments are already 
deemed robust enough for the small-scale sector (Mahon, 1997). 
Though unreported, these fisheries are not necessarily illegal, and 
any distinction of this kind is again lost in the blanket use of “IUU” 
(see Shajahan, 2012). This conflation of unreported fishing as IUU 
fishing, regardless of context or conditions, has led to perverse as-
sumptions around the status of small-scale fisheries. For example, 
Watson and Tidd (2018) classify 80% of all non-industrial fisheries 
globally from 1950 to 2015 as “IUU” because there was no recov-
erable record of landing. While correct in the sense that this fishing 
is not reported, this non-differentiated use of “IUU” delegitimizes 
these fisheries with little consideration of their regulatory status, 
local economic importance or contribution to overall fish stock or 
habitat status.
Finally, unregulated fishing is perhaps the most ambiguous cate-
gory of “IUU” (Rosello, 2017; Theilen, 2013). Much of this ambiguity 
extends from the IPOA-IUU, which permits certain unregulated fish-
ing if it “take[s] place in a manner that is not in violation of applicable 
international law and may not require the application of measures” 
(FAO, 2001a, p. 3). In other words, a fishery is considered unregu-
lated based on the status of the prevailing national or sub-national 
regulatory system, rather than that fishery's compliance with the 
regulatory system in place (FAO, 2015). This becomes all the more 
problematic when coastal and inland small-scale fisheries are largely 
unregulated by the state, with de jure open access, in order for small-
scale fisheries to meet wider societal goals, such as livelihood and 
food security in remote and often poor communities (e.g. India, Sri 
Lanka, Indonesia and Kiribati; also recreational fisheries in countries 
like South Korea).
The lack of explicit government regulation does not necessar-
ily mean there are no well-functioning rules or systems in place. As 
Arthur (2020, p. 1) notes, “not restricting who can fish may represent 
a viable management option for some small-scale fisheries, partic-
ularly where there are migratory fishers, seasonal waterbodies or 
fluctuating resources.” For example, customary rules regulating local 
access to stocks and habitat, often even adapting to changing cli-
matic conditions, have been widely shown to function effectively 
in small-scale fisheries (e.g. Jul-Larsen, Kolding, Overå, Nielsen, & 
Zwieten, 2003; Kolding & van Zwieten, 2011; Ruddle & Satria, 2010; 
Tezzo, Kura, Baran, & Wah, 2017). In such cases, “unregulated” ap-
pears to be more a matter of weak government recognition of such 
customary rules which develop, for example, through social ties 
or co-management (e.g. Alexander, Staniczenko, & Bodin, 2020; 
D’Armengol, Castillo, Ruiz-Mallén, & Corbera, 2018). The policy at-
tention on unregulated fishing may stem from an acknowledgement 
that, despite the presence of official rules, enforcement of small-
scale fisheries is made difficult by either the inadequate functioning 
of the state or the inability of the state to cope with distant and/
or largely illegible fishing, trade and processing practices (Doddema, 
Spaargaren, Wiryawan, & Bush, 2018; Serdy, 2011; Song, Johnsen, 
& Morrison, 2018).
In summary, the non-differentiation of “illegal,” “unreported” 
and “unregulated” has the potential to undermine the viability and 
legitimacy of small-scale fisheries. The consequences for small-scale 
fisheries, though some more than others depending on individual 
contexts, are that they are not differentiated from industrial fisher-
ies despite making a distinctly different contribution to both coastal 
economies and overfishing.
3  | TR ADE RESTRIC TIONS TO FIGHT IUU 
FISHING
The blanket uptake of “IUU fishing” in international trade regulation 
by major importing markets such as the EU and the US1 holds sig-
nificant risks for small-scale fisheries. Notably, the EU-IUU regula-
tion (EC Reg. No. 1005/2008) is an explicit attempt to incentivize the 
governments of fish exporting countries to take action to prevent 
and eliminate IUU fishing conducted in their waters or by their fleets 
(for more details, see He, 2017; Leroy, Galletti, & Chaboud, 2016; van 
der Marel, 2017; Miller et al., 2014; Rosello, 2017; Sumaila, 2019). 
The EU-IUU regulation does not target specific sectors in isolation—
whether small-scale or industrial sectors. Having a broad mandate, 
it requires states to implement a catch certification scheme that en-
sures that catches are traceable from vessels through the markets, 
and compliant to conservation and management measures agreed 
upon for coastal and high seas waters.
Countries not cooperating with the IUU regulation are prohib-
ited from trading fish landed from their waters to the EU or the fish 
caught by vessels flying their flag. Exporting countries must demon-
strate continued compliance with the requirements of the IUU reg-
ulation or bear the opportunity costs of being excluded from the 
European Common Market. Non-compliance is initially sanctioned 
with a “yellow card” warning, followed by a “red card” if they are 
found to be in repeated contravention of the regulation's require-
ments (EU-IUU Reg. Article 31[3]). A yellow card requires improve-
ments to be addressed according to an agreed timeline. If these 
requirements are not met, a red card is issued, at which time all 
fisheries in that country, irrespective of species and sectors, will be 
banned from exporting fish products to the European common mar-
ket. Since its inception in 2010 until July 2019, the EU issued 25 yel-
low cards. Of these, 15 were resolved without further sanctions at 
time of writing, while six led to a red card being issued (see Figure 1).
The EU’s trade-based control of IUU fishing has had a demon-
strable impact on both national fisheries management systems and 
the conduct of fishers. For example, after receiving a yellow card 
in 2014 the Philippine government amended the national Fisheries 
Code, leading to stronger penalties for legal violations and a greater 
emphasis on data collection and monitoring (Republic Act 10654) 
(Espenilla, 2019; Oceana, 2017). Similarly, Thailand revised their 
fisheries legislation and implemented a series of reforms in the moni-
toring and surveillance of fishing vessels in reaction to concerns over 
“slave” labour in Thai fishing fleets (Marschke & Vandergeest, 2016), 
and Sri Lanka and Belize both made reforms to the enforcement 
of catch documentation (Government of Belize, 2013; Leroy 
et al., 2016).
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Despite its apparent success and a call to extend such mea-
sures to other major import markets (e.g. Sumaila, 2019), we argue 
that the issuance of yellow and red cards (inadvertently) has had a 
disproportionate impact on small-scale fisheries in at least three 
ways.
First, as outlined above, the categorical use of “IUU” overlooks 
important differences between small-scale fisheries and industrial 
fishing operations. Ignoring these differences can mean that the 
small-scale sector is seen as an easier target for reform than the in-
dustrial sector. Such a scenario has been observed in the case of 
Ghana, which received a yellow card from the EU in November 2013 
for, among others, inadequate reliability of MCS systems and catch 
certification schemes, and poor compliance with RFMO regulations 
(European Commission, 2015). While various legislative reforms 
were introduced to manage the industrial fleet, in practice, the illegal 
use of lights and chemicals by small-scale fishers became a conspicu-
ous object of scrutiny in the name of curbing IUU fishing (Afoakwah, 
Osei, & Effah, 2018). Artisanal fishing nets were seized, and spe-
cial courts set up in collaboration with Chief Justice and Attorney 
General's offices to prosecute fishers engaging in IUU fishing, in-
cluding small-scale operators (Gyesi, 2019). By treating reforms in 
the small-scale sector as a means of addressing a yellow card aimed 
at the industrial sector, the Ghanaian authorities have also avoided 
addressing the illegal transshipment behaviour of domestically reg-
istered but largely Chinese-owned and operated industrial fleet (EJF 
& Hen Mpoano, 2019)—China being an important trade partner and 
source of aid. This case shows how the politics of illegal fishing can 
create pressure for action that does not address the causes of the 
most problematic forms of fishing while tending to opt for a more 
convenient target.
Second, the EU-IUU regulation stipulates data collection and re-
porting requirements that in turn lead to the “procedural exclusion” 
of small-scale fisheries from markets (Bondaroff, Teale, Reitano, & 
Werf, 2015; Houssa & Verpoorten, 2015). The wider trend towards 
information systems encourages fisher enrolment to the EU-IUU 
regulation, but also enables fishers to comply with private initiatives 
such as the “IUU Fishing Index” (Macfadyen, Hosch, Kaysser, & 
Tagziria, 2019) and/or Global Fishing Watch (Kroodsma et al., 2018). 
Although small-scale fisheries have been given some concession in 
the design of the EU regulation, resulting in simplified catch certifi-
cates for instance,3 small-scale fisheries are nevertheless being facil-
itated to verify their catch and provide landing documentation for 
individual vessels, and in doing so gaining or maintaining access to 
export markets (see Doddema et al., 2018; Duggan & Kochen, 2016). 
Difficulties with compliance have been noted, such as how to effec-
tively validate the data entered by the captains of fishing vessels 
given insufficient logistics and infrastructure available at provincial 
landing sites as well as the absence of government rules to oblige 
small-scale vessels to produce catch documentation (Doddema, 
Spaargaren, Wiryawan, & Bush, 2020; Siriraksophon, Kawamura, & 
Imsamrarn, 2016). Perhaps more importantly, these informational 
demands incur negative material consequences for small-scale fish-
eries. Greater transparency can engender greater regulatory over-
sight that might constrain their ability to maintain their already often 
marginal mode of production. Reporting procedures can also be par-
ticularly onerous for small-scale fishers for which relatively little 
data are available, especially where management and trading rela-
tions continue to rely on informal and customary arrangements 
(Steenbergen et al., 2019). In addition, there can be real costs to in-
crease information provision. As observed in the Philippines after 
the EU issued a yellow card (see Fabinyi, Dressler, & Pido, 2019; 
Sari, 2015), the registration of boats, gears and fishers themselves, 
as well as upgrading landing sites and training fishers and fishery 
experts, imposes significant extra costs that are not easily 
recuperated.
Third, the EU-IUU regulation does not discriminate in terms of 
the relative importance that the small-scale sector plays in do-
mestic markets. Analysing multi-country fish trade data, Sumaila 
(2019) concludes that small developing countries, such as Cote 
d’Ivoire, Seychelles and Maldives, would face the highest eco-
nomic risk of being red carded given their high dependence on the 
EU market, with between 70% and 90% of their catch being sent 
to the EU. In fact, the “poorest” countries classified as “low-in-
come countries” (e.g. Liberia, Togo) tend to show the largest share 
of small-scale fisheries within the 25 carded countries (Figure 1).4 
These are countries with arguably the least financial and adminis-
trative capacity to make the required changes to fishing and pro-
cessing activities, including access to information and tracking 
technologies and infrastructure (e.g. use of Automatic 
Identification System [AIS] data is biased towards larger vessels in 
upper-middle-income and high-income countries, Taconet, 
Kroodsma, & Fernandes, 2019).
The EU has provided assistance to developing countries to help 
them address deficiencies in MCS and legal systems and comply with 
the requirements of the IUU regulation. However, by neither ac-
counting for the systematic challenges of implementing IUU-related 
regulation in return for market access, nor considering the relative 
overall contribution of those countries to I, U or U fishing, the EU 
runs the risk of placing a disproportionate burden on small-scale 
fishery-dependent countries.5
 3The simplified catch certificate is laid down in Article 6 of Commission Regulation 
1010/2010, where it stipulates the criteria of a small vessel as follows: (a) with an overall 
length of less than 12 m without towed gear; or (b) with an overall length of less than 8 
meters with towed gear; or (c) without a superstructure; or (d) of less than measured 20 
GT.
 4Proportion of SSF to total fisheries was constructed through: [marine SSF 
landings + inland fisheries landings]/[total marine landings + inland fisheries landings], by 
using sector disaggregated data of marine landings of the Sea Around Us project (Pauly & 
Zeller, 2015) and integrated inland fisheries landing estimates from Funge-Smith (2018). 
Number of months subjected to EU carding was derived from the dates that the EU 
issued yellow, red or green card (available at IUU Watch, 2019), as at July 2019.
 5For instance, Tsamenyi et al. (2009, p. xv) state that the EU “must acknowledge the 
vulnerability of developing countries and the difficulties that they will face in 
implementing the [EU trade] regulation. It is essential that developing countries do not, 
directly or indirectly, bear a disproportionate burden of global efforts to combat IUU 
fishing.”
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4  | IUU FISHING A S ORGANIZED CRIME
The non-differentiation of IUU fishing also means that all fisheries, 
including small-scale fisheries, are potentially being reframed as sub-
ject to criminalization. This reframing corresponds with a shift from 
fishing activity being dealt with through administrative-law, focused 
on strengthening management rules and stepping up compliance 
levels, to IUU fishing dealt with through criminal-law, facilitated 
through intelligence-led policing with a view to prosecution and im-
prisonment (Chapsos & Hamilton, 2019; de Coning & Witbooi, 2015; 
Liddick, 2014; Page & Ortiz, 2020; Stølsvik, 2019; UNODC, 2011; 
Vrancken, Witbooi, & Glazewski, 2019). It expands the scope of IUU 
F I G U R E  1   Proportion of small-scale fisheries to total fisheries of countries carded by the EU, listed by country income groups. The two 
numbers in square bracket denote the number of months a yellow card and red card were issued for, respectively, between 2010 and July 
2019. (LIC: low-income countries; LMI: lower-middle-income countries; UMI: upper-middle-income countries; HIC: high-income countries)
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activity to a far broader set of activities including money laundering, 
corruption, human trafficking, slavery and document and customs 
fraud that in turn expands the potential scope for criminal policing 
and surveillance of fishers in general (Vrancken et al., 2019).
There is growing evidence of this shift to associate IUU fishing 
with criminal activity in various international fora. IUU fishing now 
makes up one of five broad areas of environmental crime by the 
EU, the Group of Eight (G8) and the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP) (de Coning, 2016). It was also identified as a new 
trend in crime during the Twelfth United Nations Congress on Crime 
Prevention and Criminal Justice in 2010. Aside from INTERPOL, 
which is directly involved in cross-border investigations of IUU fish-
ing through joint information-gathering and multilateral operations 
among member countries, other major international organizations 
have also taken steps to combat IUU-cum-criminal activities in the 
fisheries sector (e.g. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development [OECD], the African Union and the International 
Labour Organisation) (de Coning, 2016; Stølsvik, 2019).
While the criminalization of IUU has focused mainly on inter-ju-
risdictional fisheries, several countries have also taken action at the 
national level. For example, Vietnam revised its national fisheries 
law in 2017 (Law No. 18/2017/QH14) making an extensive range 
of illegal commercial fishing (including failures to keep logbooks 
and non-adherence to RFMO rules) open to criminal prosecution. 
In South Africa, Isaacs and Witbooi (2019) report that the Marine 
Living Resources Act, the primary legislation addressing the coun-
try's marine fisheries, now criminalizes almost all transgressions 
of its provisions and regulations. This has resulted in direct steps 
being taken by the government to investigate and prosecute those 
suspected of illegal fishing activities. In other countries, such as 
Indonesia and Tanzania, there is also anecdotal evidence that con-
firms the formal criminalization of illegal fishing, including the use of 
mobile courts where fishers who violated licensing or gear require-
ments can be charged and sentenced instantly (see “Mobile courts 
can curb illegal fishing”, 2019).
The all-encompassing criminalization of fisheries becomes highly 
problematic, however, when extended to small-scale fisheries, where 
the categories of legality/illegality are more blurred. Such categories 
become doubtful when the activity of small-scale fishers “doing what 
they have always done” (Bell et al., 2007, p. 413) come to be seen as en-
gaging in new forms of criminally organized illegal fishing operations. 
As illustrated in the case of West Coast rock lobster in South Africa, 
organized criminal groups may be entrenched within coastal commu-
nities who enrol local fishers with few alternative livelihood opportu-
nities to participate in illegal harvesting (Isaacs & Witbooi, 2019). The 
criminalization of small-scale fisheries in such contexts is made fur-
ther opaque by the patronage these gangs exercise over fishing com-
munities by, for example, supporting school fees and cash advances 
for food in return for exercising illegal fishing activities (Isaacs, 2011, 
2013; Isaacs & Witbooi, 2019; McMullan & Perrier, 2009). In such a 
setting, a clear demarcation of who is part of an organized syndicate 
and who is not becomes ambiguous (see also Chapsos, Koning, & 
Noortmann, 2019). Subsequently, it requires a careful judgement as 
to whether small-scale fishers engaging in “IUU” activity are in fact in 
control of the criminal organization of that activity; that is, controlling 
the means by which the IUU fishing is perpetuated.
As argued by Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized 
Crime (The Global Initiative, 2014), the failure to distinguish be-
tween those organizing and those exercising illegal behaviour has 
serious consequences for small-scale fishers. First, there is weak 
evidence that the criminalization of IUU fishing has led to the con-
viction of controlling or organizing illegal behaviour. Instead, it is 
small-scale fishers already exploited in low-income, labour-intensive 
fishing activity who have been the focus of policing and legal perse-
cution (Isaacs & Witbooi, 2019; The Global Initiative, 2014). Second, 
by not focusing on those organizing illegal fishing, there is height-
ened risk of state-sponsored violence against fishing communities. 
For example, criminalizing fishers as “poachers” directly impacts 
livelihoods and the resilience of communities as well as “exacerbates 
rifts between citizens and the state” (The Global Initiative, 2014, p. 
3). It may even bring lethal outcomes as observed from the case of 
fishermen being shot dead for “intruding” on newly imposed marine 
reserves (e.g. Gustave & Borchers, 2008). The consequence is that 
those who depend on small-scale fisheries bear the burden of stig-
matization, sanctions and even bodily harm, as the international dis-
course pushes for the criminalization of IUU fishing.
5  | MAKING IUU REGUL ATION WORK FOR 
SMALL-SC ALE FISHERIES
As laws and regulations to combat IUU fishing continue to be rolled 
out, the risk to small-scale fisheries will continue to grow. Very real 
consequences of surveillance and criminalization as well as exclu-
sion from export trade regardless of their IUU status are already 
being observed. At worst, IUU regulation of all kinds will contribute 
to the de-legitimization of small-scale fisheries, by framing them as 
inherently ungovernable (i.e. inherently illegal, unregulated and un-
reported) rather than as a major contributor to coastal food secu-
rity, economies and cultures (Béné, Hersoug, & Allison, 2010; Mills 
et al., 2011; Teh & Pauly, 2018). Yet despite the consequences of the 
IUU discourse for small-scale fisheries, we remain optimistic that this 
oversight can be rectified. The challenge, we argue, is to rethink how 
IUU fishing policy and regulation can support a more constructive 
and ultimately more equitable incorporation of small-scale fisheries 
in the global fight against IUU fishing. Rethinking how IUU fishing 
can work in the interest of small-scale fisheries could start with any 
combination of the following three strategies (see Figure 2).
First, dedicated provisions could be made in international, regional 
and national IUU-related policy and regulation that acknowledge the 
role and importance of small-scale fisheries to food security and local 
economies. Making such provisions would constitute an important 
step in providing an adequate and fair representation of the activities 
of small-scale fishers. It will also directly help to move beyond the cat-
egorical use of IUU outlined above and instead force policymakers to 
be more precise in their use and allocation of illegal, unregulated and 
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unreported when distinguishing between industrial and small-scale 
fisheries. More precise language will increase the likelihood of more 
contextualized measures and regulation that distinguish the kinds of 
small-scale fishery activity that does contribute to stock decline or 
habitat degradation and those activities that do not.
Some international measures are already making such provi-
sions that are instructive. For instance, the Port State Measures 
Agreement makes an exception for small-scale fisheries (e.g. “ves-
sels engaged in artisanal fishing for subsistence,” see Article 3.1a), 
and the US Seafood Import Monitoring Program (SIMP),1 exempts 
importers from providing vessel-specific information if the catches 
are from small-scale vessels (up to 12 m in length or 20 gross tons). 
Further, the SIMP allows reporting to be aggregated for single-col-
lection-point, single-calendar-day catches by multiple small-scale 
fishing vessels, substantially reducing the amount of export docu-
ments required. Small-scale fisheries would benefit if such excep-
tions were extended to the EU-IUU regulation, as well as private 
initiatives such as the IUU Fishing Index and Global Fishing Watch—
all of which risk making generalized assumptions of national-level 
performance that target national governments rather than allow 
space for differentiation between fleets or sectors (see Taconet 
et al., 2019). Better representation in such fora by small-scale fish-
eries organizations would also better ensure they receive due rec-
ognition of how international IUU policies affect their conduct and 
performance.
Second, the global community may consider utilizing a multi-
lateral framework whereby IUU fishing control targets take into 
account differences in the countries’ economic status, administra-
tive and technical capacity and also in the composition and nature 
of their fishing industries. While the idea of non-uniform targets is 
antithetical to the current EU- and US-IUU regulations by which all 
countries are to be placed on a “level playing field,” the practice of 
common but differentiated responsibilities is in fact well established 
in related international fora, particularly in the domain of climate 
change mitigation via the “Nationally Determined Contributions” 
scheme under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(Mbeva & Pauw, 2016). One potential pathway, for instance, could 
be to enhance ongoing debates on harmful subsidies at the World 
Trade Organization, where subsidies may be allowed in support of 
“non-IUU”-related small-scale fisheries. Such a flexible and more eq-
uitable strategy would allow each country to determine ambitions 
and strategies that meet IUU challenges while considering their own 
political, social and economic contexts. But it would also require in-
ternational guidance by the overall framework of the convention. 
The result would be that rather than all countries being forced to 
comply with regulations set by a few importing market jurisdictions, 
the global fight against IUU fishing would be made more sensitive to 
the diverse circumstances faced by countries still largely dependent 
on the small-scale sector.
Finally, in a more radical move, bespoke mechanisms could be 
established to counter IUU fishing to deal with the most destructive 
small-scale fishery practices. Despite the high complexity and di-
versity of small-scale fisheries, attempts that rely on greater self-re-
porting and control over IUU activity in and by small-scale fisheries 
seem plausible. For instance, using an increasing range of relatively 
inexpensive digital sensing technologies on vessels and landing 
sites, small-scale fishers are already demonstrating their legal, re-
ported and even regulated conduct (Bush et al., 2017; Starr, 2016). 
Key to such a system is not only the incorporation of these technol-
ogies into the practices of fishers (Doddema et al., 2018), but also 
control over the data and information collected (Bush et al., 2017; 
Duggan & Kochen, 2016). Fishers, governments and buyers will 
need to view the collection and presentation of this information as 
both a credible and legitimate representation of small-scale fisher-
ies behaviour. The merit of such a system is that it would reverse 
the “burden of proof” placed on small-scale fishers to prove their 
activities are non-IUU. Necessary conditions for such a shift to be 
a realistic option for small-scale fishers include advances in sensing 
technology that are sensitive to the activities of fishers (Toonen & 
Bush, 2020) in combination with NGOs or the private sector fulfilling 
the role of data collectors and technology service providers (Bush 
et al., 2017). Recognition and support by national governments is 
also needed to secure small-scale fisher rights over the data and re-
sources on which they report, and importing states to recognize the 
F I G U R E  2   Three possible strategies 
for responsibly incorporating small-scale 
fisheries into IUU fishing regulation, and 
how they are characterized according 
to the degree of reform and the scale of 
action [Colour figure can be viewed at 
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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credibility of market claims made by these fishing communities—
much as they do the information coming from organizations like 
Global Fishing Watch. While currently only at the ideational stage, 
there are precedents from which we can learn. For example, partic-
ipatory guarantee systems in organic agriculture work on the basis 
of social control generated through local ownership of the terms 
of surveillance. This has facilitated localized system of assurance 
and verification, helping to recognize context-specific systems as 
credible and legitimate (see Loconto & Hatanaka, 2018). Hence, this 
innovative model could offer more sensitive and effective means of 
deterring unauthorized and ecologically harmful small-scale fishing 
practices.
These three strategies provide a starting point for further 
debate over the current role of and the potential alternatives to 
global IUU regulations. All three strategies recognize the need to 
move beyond homogenizing narratives, policies and regulation 
that treat illegal, unreported and unregulated as the same thing. 
They also help to think more carefully about the consequences 
“IUU” holds for small-scale fisheries compared with industrial 
fisheries. Making exceptions, allowing for differences or creating 
bespoke solutions can offer three alternative strategies for small-
scale fishers in any given context. It is, however, more likely that 
a combination of these strategies will be needed to overcome the 
underlying assumptions that both implicitly and explicitly corral 
small-scale fisheries into an undifferentiated bundle of “IUU” fish-
ers and fishing practices.
Determining which of these or other strategies are most effective 
will depend in large part on first recognizing the important contribu-
tions small-scale fisheries make to national and local economies. Such 
recognition is in fact well underway through, for example, the FAO-led 
Voluntary Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries 
(see Jentoft, Chuenpagdee, Barragán-Paladines, & Franz, 2017). 
Linking small-scale IUU strategies to the Guidelines would at the very 
least acknowledge that small-scale fisheries are to be approached 
differently than large-scale operations. But it can also be a first step 
in gaining the political recognition necessary for thinking differently 
about the relationship that states have with small-scale fishers. By 
reimagining the relationship between small-scale fisheries and IUU 
fishing, more effective, legitimate and morally justifiable approaches 
can be put in place that in the long run may also enable small-scale 
fishers to become part of the solution rather than (intentionally or not) 
marginalizing them in the global fight against IUU fishing.
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